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This Memorandum (often referred to as the White
Paper on Brandt) has come under severe criticism as
being a negative or unimaginative response to the
Brandt Report. Unimaginative it certainly is, since the
Memorandum does not contain a single new alternative
proposal, let alone a vision of a new international
order. But, to be fair to its authors, in their view of the
world there is no need for any new vision or new ideas,
since a) the existing order and institutions are perfectly
capable of adapting themselves to new requirements,
as they have done in the past; and b) most, or all, of the
adjustment measures which are needed have already
been put forward and are under active international
debate. The perception of the Memorandum is that
the changes which have occurred over the last ten
years or so are not fundamental or revolutionary
enough to require an entirely new order, new institutions,
or even a reversal of policies.
This must obviously be a matter of judgement. Many
economists and observers, even outside the Third
World, would argue that the events of the 1970s have
destroyed the foundations of the world system which,
on the whole, worked well during the 1950s and 1960s,
and hence that these changes are fundamental and
revolutionary enough to require new thinking, a 'new
order' and a new, or at least thoroughly revamped, set
of institutions.
The Memorandum in being critical of the Brandt
Reportusually more implicitly than directly makes
sorne valid points. Two in particular may be mentioned
here:
1. The Memorandum emphasises the impact of
rising oil prices as one of the factors responsible for
the slowing-down of economic growth and for the
plight of so many oil-importing Third World (NOPEC)
countries. This puts a finger on a major weakness in
the Brandt Report, which was much too diplomatic
and timid in addressing OPEC. The Memorandum
is quite right in saying of the oil producing countries
that 'the policies they adopt on oil production and
pricing and on management of their financial surpluses,
will to a large extent determine the economic prospects
for developing countries without oil'. The Me-
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mnorandumn is also justified in pointing out that
direct comparisons of percentages of GNP given in
aid by OECD and OPEC countries are misleading
(even if OPEC aid were distributed fairly among the
NOPEC countries, which is clearly not the case). 'In
contrast to the constraints on OECD countries,
many OPEC countries have the benefit of large
surpluses earned by their higher priced oil.'
But, while the Memorandum in these respects fills a
gap left by the Brandt Report, it does not make it
clear enough a) that OPEC's is not the sole
responsibility for the troubles of the Third World
and the world economy; and b) what exactly the
industrial countries would be prepared to do to
match any restraint by OPEC on oil and oil prices
and any concessions to NOPEC countries. Thus
one must receive the Memorandum with mixed
feelings: while it addresses OPEC more firmly than
the Brandt Report did, it lays itself open to the
suspicion that OPEC is being used as a scapegoat
for the failures of the OECD countries.
2. The Memorandum is also justified in objecting
to the simplistic North/South categorisation of the
Brandt Report, dominating not only its title but also
its content. There are at least five relevant categories:
j) the 'North/West'; the OECD countries; ii) the
'North/East'; the Russian bloc; iii) OPEC, or at least
the surplus OPEC countries; iv) the NICs: the newly
industrialising medium-income countries; and y)
the poor NOPEC countries. One can agree further
that this calls for a complex world economic system
'which can accommodate them all'. But this does
not imply, as the Memorandum assumes, that this
world system must have a strong family resemblance
to the present world economic system which 'has
regularly and flexibly adapted to changing conditions
and can be adapted further'. There is no serious
discussion of the Brandt Commission's position that
the changes now required exceed the limits of
simple adaptation of the present system.
Next, we may look at the question of mutual interest.
In this respect there is a curious, though superficial,
alliance between the Brandt Report and the
Government Memorandum. Both believe in some
version of pre-established harmony in the world
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economy. But the Memorandum favours a 'trickle-
down' model as against the Brandt Report's 'engine
of growth' model.
The Memorandum fervently supports the Brandt Report
in its emphasis on mutual interest. However, there is a
subtle, but major, difference between what the Brandt
Report means by mutual interest and by what the
Government Memorandum ends up by defining as
mutual interest. This difference emerges most clearly
in the Memorandum's phrase that the British aid
programme should serve Britain's 'commercial interests'.
The Brandt Report, however, talked about the interests
of the industrial countries in seeing fuller employment
and a more stable and harmonious world economy in
general, with the possibility of the Third World acting
as an 'engine of growth', which is not necessarily
identical with direct 'commercial interests'. The
difference is somewhat similar to that between the
private and social benefits of development projectsa
well-established distinction. Moreover, the Brandt Report
does not to the extent that the Government
Memorandum does eliminate moral arguments in
order to replace them with 'mutual interests'. Rather,
it argues for the existence of a sort of 'invisible hand'
by which what is morally right and equitable also
miraculously turns out to be in the long-term interests
of the industrial countries.
Moreover, the Government Memorandum shows no
real understanding of the major argument of the
Brandt Report that such a coincidence of interests is
particularly strong in times of depression and unutilised
capacities. The Memorandum throughout argues that
the immediate job for the UK is 'to put its own house in
order', mainly by getting rid of inflation. This avoids
the Brandt Report's main argument: that its proposals
are the best way in which the industrial countries can
'put their house in order', and that this may require a
new international order.
Turning to international trade, the Government
Memorandum makes another of those ambivalent
points which are superficially progressive, but do not
take account of deep underlying differences. The
Memorandum declares its intention to maintain a
system of the freest possible trade 'keeping restrictions
and controls to a minimum'. This is an important and
essential contribution to world development. But one
is bound to point out that putting control of inflation
first and trying to achieve this by putting the brakes on
domestic production has the same restrictive effect on
imports from developing countries as the imposition
of controls combined with a higher volume of domestic
activity. The same argument, regarding the importance
of giving developing countries access to our markets
for their exports, can be used not only for the avoidance
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of tariffs and other restrictions but also to avoid
policies which result in undue failure to use our
domestic capacities.
As regards growth in the world economy, the Memoran-
durn states firmly that 'the Western industrial countries,
including the UK, roust be the main motors of this
growth'. This is in direct opposition to the scenario
suggested by the Brandt Report, under which the
developing countries would be the main motor of
growth of the world economy. Now, there is no pre-
determined 'correct' view in this matter. In the 1950s
and 1960s, the Western industrial countries did act as
a main motor of the growth of the world economy, and
it is possible to think of a scenario in which they would
once again resume this role, as one can also, like the
Brandt Commission, put forward an alternative. What
surely cannot be argued is that at the present time the
Western industrial countries are playing the role of
main motor of the world economy. On the contrary, it
is the developing NOPEC countries, which, by
maintaining huge balance of payments deficits and
import surpluses, act as a motor for the world
economy.
The authors of the Memorandum would argue that
once inflation has been brought under control and the
adjustment to the higher cost of oil made, the Western
countries will resume growth and become the 'main
motors' once again. But this adjustment and the control
of inflation, in the rnonetarist perspective of the
Memorandum, requires action which would make the
Western countries or at least the UK, a brake on the
world economy, rather than a motor, while the
adjustment and control of inflation lasts; and it would
do so at the expense of the poorest countries in the
world economy. Clearly, a double assumption is
involved:
that the measures now undertaken, at the temporary
expense, at least, of the world economy, will bring
inflation under control;
that once inflation has been brought under control,
growth will be resumed as if nothing had happened.
But the second assumption implies that once growth
in the Western countries has been resumed, the price
of oil will not rise further, thus starting a new cycle of
restraint and deflationary action. This goes against
everything we know about the power and policy of
OPEC. Thus, one must conclude that the Brandt
Report's scenario is more realistic than that assumed
in the Memorandum.
There seems only one possible arrangement under
which OPEC would not raise oil prices further, once
growth resumes, and thus bring the whole pack of
cards tumbling down again: an agreement on oil
prices. But this agreement can only be reached as part
of a joint bargain which includes taking the kind of
action on behalf of developing countries suggested in
the Brandt Report.
There is a potent argument for international Keynesian-
ism neglected in the Memorandum. While the adjustment
lasts and we have unemployment and other under-
utilised resources, the social or real cost of resource
transfers to poorer countries is sharply reduced (and
could even be zero or negative). If the Memorandum
argues that we must wait until we have successfully
adjusted and growth resumes, it thus says, in effect,
that we can only afford aid to developing countries
when its real cost to us is high, and not when it is low or
zero. Put in this way, the proposition loses much of its
Puritan/comnmonsense appeal (based on false analogy
with the private household) and appears more in the
nature of a paradox.
The Government is naturally entitled to act according
to its own opinions, at least as far as domestic policy is
concerned. If it prefers domestic monetarism to domestic
Keynesianism, that is a matter which may be debated;
at the risk of sounding callous, one would say that the
stakes are relatively tolerable, providing that the structure
of a welfare state for the unemployed is maintained.
However, when aversion to Keynesianism is extended
from the national to the international scene, what is at
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stake is the livelihood or even survival (to use the
Brandt Report's term) of the poorest countries and the
poorest people in the world. Moreover, it is surprising
that a Memorandum which rightly stresses the diversity
of conditions in the so-called Third World and objects
to any polarisation or confrontation, should not hesitate
to speak in this matter, not only for the UK but
generally for the Western industrial countries, whose
position, ideology and policies vary no less than those
of the developing countries.
A final point should be made. One must hope that the
UK will be judged by the world community, not by the
words of this Memorandum, but rather by its actions,
In terms of action, the UK has been by no means
among the lagging partners on the Western side. But it
seems a policy exists of not getting credit for our
actions by denying them in 'tough' words. The objection
to the Summit meeting in Mexiconow withdrawnis
a good case in point. It is certainly disappointing that
such a further step should be neededsome of us
thought that the Brandt Commission was a Summit.2
But once it was clear that it was not, that more was
needed to generate political will from the top, objections
to the Summit meeting could all too easily be interpreted
as objections to progress.
2The author shared the hope that a Summit might not be necessary.
See H. W. Singer: 'The Brandt Report: a northwestern' point of
view', Third World Quarterly, October 1980, pp 694'700.
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